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FOREWORD 
The International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 
is preparing a Handbook of Systems Analysis, which will appear 
in three volumes: 
Volume 1: Overview is aimed at a widely varied audience 
of producers and users of systems analysis studies. 
Volume 2: Methods is aimed at systems analysts and other 
members of systems analysis teams who need basic knowledge of 
methods in which they are not expert; this volume contains 
introductory overviews of such methods. 
a Volume 3: Cases contains descriptions of actual systems 
analyses that illustrate the diversity of the contexts and 
methods of systems analysis. 
Drafts of the material for Volume 1 are being widely 
circulated for comment and suggested improvement. This Working 
Paper is the current draft of Chapter 10. Correspondence is 
invited. 
Volume 1 will consist of the following ten chapters: 
1. The context, nature, and use of systems analysis 
2. The genesis of applied systems analysis 
3. Examples of applied systems analysis 
4. The methods of applied systems analysis: An 
introduction and overview 
5. Formulating problems for.systems analysis 
6. Objectives, constraints, and alternatives 
7. Predicting the consequences: Models and modeling 
8. Guidance for decision 
9. Implementation 
10. The practice of applied systems analysis 
To these ten chapters will be added a glossary of systems analysis 
terms and a bibliography of basic works in the field. 
12 October 1981 
Hugh J. Miser 
IIASA 
A-2361 Laxenburg 
Austria 
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CHAPTER 10. THE PRACTICE OF APPLIED SrSTWS ANALYSIS 
Hugh J.  Miser 
The previous chapters of this Handbook have described the context, nature, 
and use of applied systems analysis, sketched its hs tory,  given examples of good 
systems analysis studies, laid out the methods that  such work exhbits, dealt 
with the content of a good systems analysis study and how i t  is evolved, and pro- 
vided a perspective on the work of implementing its results. The purpose of this 
chapter is to  discuss what experience has taught systems analysts about profes- 
sional practice, that is, how to approach their work and what relations they 
should have with the clients who may use its results. 
Thus, while this chapter speaks primarily to analysts, it also speaks to  
clients by telling them what sort  of professional conduct they may expect from 
systems analysts. 
Most of the material in the earlier chapters presumes a situation in which 
the systems analysts have direct access to officials w t h  relevant responsibilities 
and authorities, whether the analysts ere employed by the same organization or 
not. Thus, we make the same assumption in this chapter. In actual fact, the  
analysts may be employed by another organization, such as a consulting firm or 
independent institute, such as the International Institute for Applied Systems 
Analysis in Laxenburg, Austria. The precepts and principles of professional prac- 
tice as we discuss them here remain the same for all of these cases; however, 
the difficulties of communication may change, depending on whether or not the 
decisionmakers and analysts work in a common administration or different 
ones, whether there are a few or many relevant officials, and so on. Since each 
situation offers its own characteristic and highly varied properties, there is little 
general guidance to be offered here, beyond the obvious fact that barriers to 
effective communication have to be removed if systems analysis work is to have 
important effect, as discussed later in t h s  chapter. 
Whle there is literature dealing with the practice of systems analysis (see, 
for example, Agin 19?8), it tends to be scattered and somewhat incomplete. 
Thus, in writing this chapter I have relied not only on relevant literature but also 
my own experience, coupled with that of others relayed to me through personal 
contact. Since systems analysis is a young and rapidly growing field, experience 
to come may well supplement and modify what is s a d  here. However, the 
reader may rest assured that everything in this chapter has served analysts well 
in significant past experience. 
2. THE ORGANIZATIONAL CONTEXT 
The concept of decision runs through much of the literature of systems 
analysis-and, indeed, much of what has been said earlier in this Handbook.  
However, t h s  concept seems to imply that whatever needs improvement in a 
problem situation can be changed adequately at a single stroke-an oversimplifi- 
cation of real life that, while useful for discussion purposes, does not represent 
the reality that we live with, particularly in the sorts of large-scale interactive 
problems that systems analysis is likely to be called on to address. 
Rather, it is perhaps better to consider the more general concept of 
change, and to think of systems analysis being called on when there is an appre- 
ciation somewhere that change may be desirable. Change may then be achieved 
by a single major decision, or it may occur as the result of a complex of smaller 
decisions made in a variety of places in a large institutional structure, but coor- 
dinated and informed by the findings of an intelligent, broad approach to the 
issue of change. The role of systems analysis then is to providee an important 
contribution to this approach. 
Perhaps the most basic task of the analyst, on whch he should gather infor- 
mation from the beginning and should have a well developed appreciation early 
in h s  work, is to understand the structure in whch change may take place. If 
no decisions leading to change are possible, the work may be of absorbing 
interest, but it will likely be in vain, unless the situation changes. If the decision 
setting presents open opportunities for change, how can the work best be 
related to this setting? There is no simple answer to this question-indeed, 
much of what this chapter has to say bears on it-but it is one the analyst must 
ask early, and keep in his mind throughout his work, as interactions with the 
client organization shed more and more light on it. The knowledge accumulated 
during the work, as relations with the client develop, can-and should-have a 
major influence on how the findings are formulated, presented, and followed up. 
Archibald (1979), in writing about fire departments, such as the one in Wilming- 
ton, Delaware, discussed in section 3.3, puts it t h s  way: 
The perspective taken is that of a "change agent" (i.e., a manager 
of change). The introduction of analysis is expected to change the end 
product or service delivered by the fire d.epartment. Most likely this 
will also mean changes in structure (the organizational system) and in 
process (the various methods and procedures employed to deliver the 
services). In turn, these changes will require members within, and 
perhaps outside, the organization to change their behavior. The 
analyst must see the issue not only in terms of solving a particular 
technical problem, but more importantly as the creation of cir- 
cw1stances that will encourage people to change their behavior. 111 
performing this task, the analyst becomes the cha-nge agent. 
Archibald also 
. . . stresses the importance of tlxnking about groups of people, 
their common motivations, their organizational positions, and their 
values as they influence decisionmaking. As the analyst moves from 
the model of the problem to the development of programs to achieve 
desired results, the importance of who makes the decisions and who 
influences the decisionmaking process cannot be overstated. 
Sound analytical results should be able to stand alone but they do 
not. People who make decisions frequently find themselves in situa- 
tions in which the analysis alone is not sufficient to  guide decisionmak- 
ing. A broad political rationality is likely to guide an individual's deci- 
sions more often than a narrower technical rationality. If political and 
managerial views are to be meshed with the specific problem-solving 
perspective of the analyst, the analyst needs to have anticipated, 
understood and tried to accommodate the values and perspectives of 
decisionmakers and the pressures they face. It is often too late to 
account for these factors (solely) during implementation. 
Here are some basic questions about the decision setting on which the 
analyst should have clear answers before he gets to the point of formulating and 
presenting findings and recommendations: 
1. What is the nature of the decision setting? Is there a single strong 
decisionmaker? Or is the decision setting a pluralistic one, in which there are 
many decisionmakers with varying degrees of power and influence, all of whom 
must be addressed? If the study is done for an organization, is its span of 
responsibility and authority complete with respect to  the problem situation 
being contemplated, or will the changes needed involve compromise or coalition 
with other organizations? 
2. What are the important properties of the decision setting? Organiza- 
tions have widely differing styles of management that usually have important 
effects on the styles of their approaches to change. The personalities of key 
persons frequently are  major determinants of these styles. The analyst cannot 
change an organization's style in a single systems study-although an  association 
involving effective work over a period can lead to changes in style-so he is well 
advised to adapt his work to it to a reasonable extent; he will have difficulty 
enough in prompting the changes that  emerge from his work as desirable 
without assuming the added burden of trying to change the organization's style 
a t  a single stroke. 
3. What constraints does the decision setting offer? The most basic and 
frequently encountered one is time: Can the systems analysis be completed in 
time to inform the decisions leading to change? If it cannot, there is little point 
in embarking on it; if it can, but only on a simplified and reduced scale, the 
analyst and the executives involved must consider whether or not such a 
"quick-and-dirty" study can help (in my experience i t  usually can). Are there 
organizational constraints such as customs, policies, laws, or regulations that  
will affect change? If so, they may have to be accepted-but surprisingly often 
they can be altered when good reasons appear. Thus, while the analyst must 
recognize such constraints, he would be unwise to accord them too sacred a 
status. It costs little to explore a constraint change in many cases, and such an 
inquiry can turn up information about constraints that  may make eliminating 
them appear to be desirable. 
4. If, as is usually the case, the work is to be done for an organization, 
what is the appropriate administrative level at  which the analysis team should 
work? There is no simple answer to this question; rather,  the proper answer will 
differ for each case, depending on many factors, not the least of whlch is the 
perasonalities and powers of the executives who may be chosen to supply the 
main administrative tie during the analysis. Since a problem situation leading to 
the need for a systems analysis almost invariably cuts across organizational 
lines, both horizontally and vertically, the organization's choice of a sponsoring 
executive offers some pitfalls. If he is ambitious and grasping, he may suppress 
findings he does not like, or the rest  of the organization may resist even obvi- 
ously desirable findings to keep him from adding to his span of power and con- 
trol; i f  he is weak and compliant, he may not give the analysis team enough sup- 
port to allow them either access to possibly embarrassing information or the 
freedom to develop potentially unpopular findings. 
5. What is the appropriate relation of the analysis staff to the administra- 
tive staff that will have to respond to the study's findings? Can an analysis group 
inside the organization be the most effective? Or should an outside group be 
employed? Will administrative formalities encumber the work? Will the sources 
of support-administrative, financial, and policy-be strong and adequate? Will 
these sources of support guarantee the analysis team the free access to  infor- 
mation that is essential to good analysis? Since the fact that systems analysis is 
being contemplated suggests that change may be called for, people in the organ- 
ization are almost sure to have mixed feelings about the analysis and the 
analysts who are doing it; in the face of t h s  fact, experience teaches that strong 
support is essential to a successful outcome. 
All of these considerations are embedded in the organizational structure 
involved with the problem situation; the character of this structure has basic 
importance for the analyst and how he thnks about the problems and their pos- 
sible solutions. For example, Archbald (1979) describes fire departments this 
way : 
Fire service organizations pose special problems and opportuni- 
ties for the manager of change. For example, the quasimilitary 
bureaucratic organization of fire departrrients is a source of resistance 
to  changes in authority structures,' tasks, and procedures; but this 
same organizational form can help expedite compliance with changes 
that have been ordered by the chief executive. The traditional single 
entry level into the organization is often a source of resistance to 
recommendations of people who have not personally experienced fire- 
fighting. Knowledge derived from unfamiliar disciplines or distant 
cities is not readily accepted by fire service personnel. 
The change agent must also learn to  deal with the crisis orienta- 
tion of fire departments, which focuses rewards on action rather than 
on contemplation. The lengthy, sequential decisionmaking process of 
systems analysis contrasts sharply with the drama of decisionmaking 
by commanding officers at  the scene of a fire. Moreover, because most 
fire departments have not experienced financial pressures until recent 
years, fire service personnel with budgeting and planning skills are few 
in number. 
The manager of change must understand how organizations 
operate, and be able to view the fire department as a collection of 
organizations interacting with other organizations. New policies that  
arise from deployment analysis are likely to have impacts on other 
organizations-such as labor unions and community groups-whose 
interests must be considered. 
This summary makes i t  clear that the character of the administrative 
structure involved in potential change is important. Therefore, the analyst may 
look for characterizations of such structures similar to the one quoted 
above-perhaps one for manufacturing companies, another for sales organiza- 
tions, still another for public service institutions. However, experience tells us 
that this is too much to hope for: I have known military organizations that were 
far more informal and unstructured than business organizations, and more 
oriented to problem solution; by the same token, some businesses are managed 
by very rigid bureaucracies, whlle others have less formal structures easily 
adapted to  change. In sum, the analyst must make his own observations about 
the nature of structure and authority for each organization he deals with, and 
factor this information into his work. 
Much more could be written about; how these basic questions about the 
organizational context relate to successful systems analysis, but experience is 
so varied that on most points it is not possible to be prescriptive. However, 
experience does tell us that the questions are  important, and that the analyst 
must develop ties with the client organization that are close and continuous 
enough to enable him to formulate answers to them. These answers, combined 
with h s  experience and common sense, are  then likely to help hlm find a path to 
effective work-or, if he cannot find this path, he has good reasons for stopping 
his work before a lot of effort is wasted. 
3. AWARENESS OF THE PROBLEM SITUATION 
As section 5.1 points out, "the systems analyst, seeking to contribute to 
real-world decisions, always finds himself facing, not a well defined problem, but 
a problem area or situation; his problem turns out to be a nexus of problems, 
what the French call a 'problematique,' or what Ackoff . . . calls ' a  mess."' While 
the manager's view may be incomplete-or even wrong-it can be accepted as a 
recognition that all is not well, and that an unsatisfactory posture should be 
examined for possible change aimed a t  improvement. 
One might conclude that the analyst should try t o  get the manager to shar- 
pen his problem statement. However, experience tells us overwhelmingly that 
this is the opposite of what is desirable at  the beginning: the analyst is well 
advised to keep the manager's appreciation of his problem as broad and general 
as possible, so that the early inquiries into the situation are free to formulate 
the problem (if indeed this is possible) without the inhibiting constraint of an  
authoritative misperception. In fact, in my experience, perhaps the worst thing 
that can happen is for the executive to write a memorandum stating what the 
problem is, particularly if he is a very strong and dominating personality; this 
statement then becomes a major deterrent to developing the realistic problem 
appreciation needed for good analysis, and makes i t  doubly hard to get this 
appreciation accepted. The moral is plain: At the beginning, keep the discus- 
sions and interactions as broad and flexible as possible, to the end that  the early 
fact finding and analysis can dominate how the problem is formulated. 
In sum, there is considerable practical experience backing the view that a 
careful problem investigation and formulation effort is an essential beginning; 
Chapter 5 provides an  approach that can be adapted to most situations. In fact, 
to skip or slight this step is to risk spending effort on the wrong problem. The 
unhappy cases where this has happened seldom make their way into the litera- 
ture, but the oral tradition contains many tales of analysis gone wrong because 
the problem investigation was not thorough enough to discover the true diffi- 
culty. For example, Agin (1978) describes one case where t h s  could have hap- 
pened: 
A manager asked for a study to examine the consolidation of three 
of his firm's plants into one. The new plant was to be constructed a t  a 
location separate from the three existing plants. A preliminary exami- 
nation of the economies which would result from the consolidation indi- 
cated the plants had no operations in common and that the proposed 
plan could only result in an  increase in costs. The executive should 
have known this so that  prior to an investigation in detail it was 
decided to review with him what he expected to achieve from the 
study. Doing this involved several days of discussion. From this, it was 
discovered that the real issue was an inability for this executive and 
the union leader a t  one of the plants t o  work together. Once this was 
recognized, a Vice President of Industrial Relations was hired to deal 
with the union and the idea of consolidation dropped. The undertaking 
of a study with little or no chance for real success was avoided. 
Where the initial problem-situation awareness exists may make consider- 
able difference to  how the analysis team proceeds. If the awareness comes from 
a high executive, to get a n  analysis started may be much easier than if the 
awareness comes from a subordinate official in an operating department. If the 
awareness is forced on the organization by outside pressures or interventions, 
the managers may resist change more strongly than if the perception originated 
inside. The analysis group itself may be the source of the perception, since its 
continuing work sharpens its views. Thus, a t  the beginning the analyst may be 
involved in discussions aimed a t  persuading managers that they are facing a 
problem situation, rather than vice versa. Many analysts feel that  t h s  is one of 
their most important duties and opportunities. Certainly, experience tells us 
that  the analysis team that only answers the doorbell is never as influential or 
useful as the  one that takes a broader and more entrepreneurial view of its 
work. In fact, as section 2.2 points out, one of the earliest perceptions of the 
operations research community was that, as Blackett (1950) said of the 1940-45 
British experience: ". . . one of the clearest lessons . . . [is] that  the really big 
successes of operational research groups are often achieved by the discovery of 
problems which had not hitherto been recognized as significant. In fact the 
most fertile tasks are often found by the groups themselves rather than given to 
them." This view is heavily underlined by operations research and systems 
analysis experience in the ensuing four decades. 
A systems analysis group may be asked to  undertake rather mundane 
analysis tasks. If this were the entire menu, the group's purpose in being would 
be completely vitiated. However, such tasks should not be shunned entirely: 
carefully chosen and done well and promptly, they can often provide entry to 
larger and more important work of systems-analytic character, both by giving 
opportunities for insights and establishing sympathetic relations with influential 
executives. Too, systems analysts must learn a great deal about the organiza- 
tions they serve, and opportunities to further this process have value in their 
own right. 
A beginning systems analysis team is seldom well advised to  plunge right a t  
the beginning into the broadest and most global problems of the organization it 
serves. Rather, it  should build up its knowledge and the confidence of the organ- 
ization through a series of smaller studies; properly chosen and organized, they 
can often constitute building blocks i.n the broad understanding that will support 
work on the global problems. 
Almost anywhere on this scale, however, the analyst looks for these three 
characteristics in a problem situation as being harbingers of challenging work: 
A responsible person recognizes a problem situation and wants help. 
The work that appears to be in prospect is functionally interdisciplinary, 
that is, it involves more than a single narrow function of the organization. 
The solutions, as well as the problem situation, appear likely to fall out- 
side the responsibility of a single small staff organization. 
They are not criteria of choice (for example, a single executive may have a 
very interesting problem over which he has control that is well worth a systems 
analysis effort), but they do suggest properties of a situation that may be partic- 
ularly challenging, and therefore particularly appropriate for systems analysis. 
Finally, as part of the issue of problem awareness, experience offers some 
advice about the management/analyst interactions and initiatives a t  the begin- 
ning: Keep them informal and somewhat fluid, so that the analyst is as free as 
possible to consider a variety of possibilities; interact as widely as possible, to 
the end of gaining as varied and comprehensive a picture of the problem situa- 
tion as possible before formal work begins. We have noted that it is generally 
undesirable for the manager to hand the analyst a t  the beginning of the first dis- 
cussion a memorandurn stating the problem; it is equally undesirable for the 
analyst, right after the first discussion, to retire to his study to prepare a prob- 
lem statement in precise terms-he is almost sure to be wrong, and thus eventu- 
ally to be embarrassed by h s  own words as the early fact-finding and analysis 
probe the problem situation. 
4. FORMULATING THE PROBLEM 
The first step to take after the conference with the official who is aware of 
the problem situation is to begin a widespread, comprehensive, first-hand, on- 
site survey. Chapter 5 provi.des guidance on how to approach thi.s activity sys- 
tematically. This survey is essential to the analyst's understanding of the situa- 
tion; the details he discovers here will give him a reasonably full picture of the 
situation. Of course, the executive most concerned can supply much informa- 
tion of thls sort, but first-hand observation is far more useful than second-hand 
description. For example, the analysts who were asked t o  study the possibility 
of increasing the productivity of a third-world steel mill, as described in section 
0.3, would have been well advised to watch all facets of the operation for a sub- 
stantial period of time; they would not then have been embarrassed to discover 
that  the operators were illiterate-and their approach to  the  problem could well 
have been much simpler, the evolution of a new approach much quicker, and the  
results as good as  what was finally achieved. The analysis team asked to con- 
sider the plant consolidation described in section 10.2, on the other hand, got to  
the bottom of the  problem-the personality conflict-before they had wasted 
time on a lengthy study of the issues of the proposed consolidation. 
Similarly, a bit of knowledge of fundamental importance and well known to 
the persons directly involved in an operation, but missed by the analysis team, 
can destroy the client's confidence in the  findings of the analysis, w e n  if this 
fact has no bearing on the f indings! An analysis team studying the problem of 
efficient supply and dispatch of tank cars for a chemical company running a 
continuous-process plant missed the fact tha t  the cars  had to be steam cleaned 
before each use; while this fact had only a very minor effect on the proposed 
course of action-indeed, the adjustment was made in a few minutes-the execu- 
tive for whom the  study was done was telling strangers several years later that  
systems analysts were of dubious value. Had the team observed the operations 
of the  railroad yard a t  the chemical plant carefully, they would not have over- 
looked this fact of vital importance to chemists (since even traces of some 
chemicals can spoil ch-emical processes) that embarrassed the  analysis team a t  
the time it was presenting its results. 
In addition to giving the analyst a well rounded view of the problem situa- 
tion, a careful initial survey may also allow htm to  discover aspects of it 
unknown to the responsible executives. Tt i.s commonplace for workers t o  con- 
ceal bad news from the boss, but share i t  with a n  outsider-a fact tha t  presents 
the analyst with a problem: If he leaks t h s  bad news to the executive, thus 
violating an  implied confidentiality, his source of reliable information may be 
cut off, and other difficulties may arise; but, if he ignores i t  in his work, he risks 
reaching conclusions sufficiently unrealistic to vitiate his findings, or their 
acceptance. There is usually a path past the horns of this dilemma, but no gen- 
eral principle can be enunciated beyond this one, which is supported by a large 
body of experience: If the  analyst should behave in any way that  makes him look 
to the workers like an  "inspector," valuable information and easy relations will 
be lost. 
The opposite case can also occur, when the  executive is seeking some sort 
of evaluation looking to organizational adjustment, when the workers may be 
quite uncooperative-with a similar dilemma for the  analyst t o  thread his way 
past. 
It 1s usually wise t o  compare the information from t h s  early survey with 
many persons involved, to be sure that  early impressions are  accurate, although 
judgment will have to be exercised about how trustworthy views and opinions 
might be. However, the number and variety of contacts will serve as a useful 
and surprisingly effective screening device. 
Note that  we have been talking here about a somewhat informal survey and 
investigation, not the formal data gathering that  may ensue a s  the project gets 
launched in earnest.  In fact,  such a survey may be a useful prelude to a decision 
about whether or not to undertake a systems-analysis project. 
With the results of this survey in h s  notebook and his head, the analyst is 
now ready to formulate an  initial appreciation of the impacts of the problem 
situation and the potential effects of change, at  least in broad terms: I s  it a tac- 
tical matter? Is i t  a strategic question? Does the  situation appear to have 
short-term or long-term consequences? Whose interests are affected, just those 
of the official inviting in the analysis team, or many others? Is the problem 
situation confined to the organization seeking help, or is it more widespread? Ts 
the impetus for the  concern an internal one, or does it come from outside the  
organization? This initial appreciation must be tentative, of course, but to make 
it explicit is an important step nonetheless-and Chapter 5 provides important 
guidance on how to go about it. 
Against this background, the analyst is ready to formulate hls preliminary 
synthesis of the situation, perhaps leading to a tentative problem statement. He 
now has some idea of the nature of the problem, what its boundaries may be, 
what a t  least some potential responses might look like, what information may be 
needed to pursue the analysis, what data-gathering work must be undertaken on 
a systematic basis, and, most important of all a t  this stage, what management 
help will be needed to make the work proceed smoothly to a n  effective conclu- 
sion. 
Thus, the analyst is now ready to prepare the analysis plan, a step often 
neglected, but one that  is in my view absolutely essential to a successful project 
of large scale. 
The skeptic may argue that ,  if research is exploring the unknown, how can 
the exploration be planned? On the other hand, the experienced applied sys- 
tems analyst will respond that  the precedent of pure science is only very par- 
tially applicable to applied systems analysis, and that  experience shows that  a 
well developed plan is an  invaluable guide to action, even when unforeseen 
events or difficulties arise, not the least because having the plan shows quickly 
what the effects of such unforeseen matters may have on schedules, resource 
needs, and so on. 
Too, the team leader needs to have an estimate of time, resources, and sup- 
port that he can put forward early, and the more detail that underlies this esti- 
mate, the more reliable it is likely to  be. 
A good analysis plan will a t  least: 
1. Describe the context of the problem. 
2. State the problem in the preliminary form developed in the initial sur- 
vey. 
3. List the other organizations with interests in the problem and its out- 
come, along with suitable descriptions, including any work that they may be 
doing on the problem. 
4. List the data and information needed to investigate the problem, and 
the activities needed to  gather this information and process it for use in the 
analysis. 
5. Lay out the analysis activities that  are foreseen. 
6. Project a schedule of key events in the progress of the analysis and in 
the reporting activities that will accompany and follow the analysis. 
7. Envision the products of the analysis activity (reports, briefings, 
backup material, and so on). 
8.  Specify the resources needed to carry out the work, including the  
reporting and followup activities. 
9. Stipulate the management interactions and assistance needed 
throughout the activity. 
10. Lay out a schedule for reporting activities that will present the results 
of the analysis to all of the constituencies that may be affected by, or interested 
in, its findings. 
11. Give a t  least a hint, if possible, of the sort of implementation activities 
that might be called for (difficult, perhaps impossible, to do a t  this early stage 
when the findings cannot be forecast-but it is not too early for the attention of 
both analysts and client to be drawn to this issue, at  least generically). 
An analysis plan may be anythng from a short memorandum for a small- I 
scale study to  a long document for a major inquiry. It has many uses: 
It can be used as the basis for negotiating with the client the support 
needed for the work. 
I t  serves as a useful goad to the analysis team to get on with its work (it 
is very easy, in the face of conflicting demands and interesting new options, to 
let a schedule slip drastically or to let the resources trickle away, particularly 
when the project is a major one over a long schedule). 
It is not only a useful check on progress, it also serves as the point of 
departure for adjustment when new events or unforeseen difficulties force 
changes on the work and its schedule. 
When the analysis team consists of many persons, perhaps a t  different 
locations, the analysis plan can be an essential instrument for keeping their 
work coordinated, even though a series of continuing interactions with the team 
leader and other workers may be needed to perfect the coordination. 
Candor compels me to  admit that practicing systems analysts do not always 
prepare analysis plans for their work-indeed, the  number who do may be in a 
minority; however, my own experience supports the worth of this step so 
strongly that  1 have no hesitation whatever in recommending it strongly to oth- 
ers. Such plans are  a commonplace among analysts working in consulting firms 
seeking analysis engagements with large organizational clients (the plan is usu- 
ally incorporated in the "proposal" to the client), but for groups working inside 
large organizations it is less common, although perhaps more needed. 
Finally, as part  of the formulation process, the head of the analysis team 
must negotiate the administrative formalities that will be associated with the 
work: financial support, administrative cooperation (both in providing access to 
information and supplying management participants in the work), arrangements 
for periodic reporting and review, possible phasing (if the project will entail 
more than one phase), and a prospect of what the final reporting process will be 
(so that the client and the analysis team have a common expectation). 
Experience has shown that the second of the points is particularly impor- 
tant: It is highly desirable that a t  least one member of the client organization 
participate in the analysis throughout in an appropriate way. This person can 
ofIer many benefits, including these: 
He can facilitate information gathering through his knowledge of the 
organization; indeed, he may be able to supply much of what is needed from his 
own resources. However, knowing where to go and whom to see can save much 
time and effort. 
As a bridge between the analysis team and the management throughout 
the project, he can keep them informed about progress between the times when 
formal progress reports are  rendered. In some cases, this person can even 
serve in an informal way to help sell unusual or unexpected findings before they 
are finally reported. 
Most contexts have hidden presumptions that everyone takes for granted, 
which may escape the analyst, since everyone in the context thinks they do not 
need to be stated. If such ignorance persists until reporting time, i t  can have a 
fatal effect  on the management's confidence in the team's mastery of the prob- 
lem (as the example of the team doing the chemical-plant analysis not knowing 
of the need to steam clean tank cars illustrates). However, the well informed 
team member from the management virtually assures that  t h s  cannot happen. 
The ensuing five sections of this chapter all deal with matters that ,  from a 
more technical standpoint, have been discussed earlier in thls Handbook.  How- 
ever, from the point of view of practice there are some points to be added that  
are important, and they will be taken up here. 
5. GATHERING INFORMATION 
The inexperienced analyst may set  out to assemb!e everything he can put 
h s  hands on, somewhat indiscriminately, with the result that he  will have a huge 
pile of data with little information content. Rather, data relevant to  the problem 
should be gathered on the basis of a carefully worked out plan (it may be the 
analysis plan itself, or an  addendum thereto) that not only lists sources and 
describes how they are  to  be  tapped, but also how the data are to  be converted 
to inform-ation bearing on the problem (see Majone 1980). Care in planning this 
work and carrying it out will ensure both relevance and focus. Too, shrewd plan- 
ning may well acheve considerable economy in this activity. 
It is well to focus on important phenomena from more than. one perspec- 
tive, in order for internal consistency to be measured, to the end that  one has 
evidence to  support h s  trust in the information-or lack thereof. External 
sources may be especially important in t h s  regard, if they can be tapped. It is 
especially important for operational and technical expertise to be incorporated 
in the available information; one of the best ways is to have such specialists as 
members of the interdisciplinary team to contribute their knowledge 
throughout the work. 
The process of collecting information to support a systems study needs to 
have continually before it the fundamental lesson of census taking: that a care- 
fully controlled sample is almost always going to  give better estimates than a 
poorly controlled attempt a t  complete enumeration. More important, perhaps, 
is the central lesson of my experience: that  what one knows about the support- 
ing evidence will play a very large role in how the findings of the analysis are 
interpreted. This point argues against using data already gathered unless abso- 
lutely necessary, and certainly against using it without knowing how it was gath- 
ered and-equally important-how it was processed. Now, systems analysts in 
many cases cannot avoid using data gathered elsewhere for other purposes 
(such as population statistics, economic data, government-generated time 
series, and the like), but considerable effort should be devoted to learning how 
these data were developed, and what their strengths and weaknesses are, so that 
the findings of the analysis can take account of such knowledge. Perhaps one of 
the most important pitfalls of analysis is to put more credence in data gen- 
erated elsewhere than the way it was developed warrants. 
Another pitfall is to gather too much material together-thus consuming 
valuable time to excess-rather than just the right amount. There is no simple 
rule to follow, except perhaps the truism that it is usually better to have a small 
amount of reliable information than to have a great deal in which one has little 
confidence. 
6. FORMULATING ALTERNATIVES 
Since Chapter 6 deals with this matter ,  we need not repeat the main points 
here. However, it is worth reemphasizing the central  importance of dealing with 
this issue imaginatively and continually throughout the systems analysis study. 
It should never be too late t o  introduce a new alternative if ideas and conse- 
quences come together to generate a new concept with preferred properties. 
If one doubts the importance of generating and considering the  most ima- 
ginatlve and promising alternatives, he should contemplate the  poverty of a 
large-scale systems analysis complete with the full panoply of computer runs, 
economic concepts, optimization models, etc.,  etc. ,  tha t  confines its attention to 
relatively simple primitive alternatives. For example, the IIASA study of future 
world energy supply and demand described in section 3.5 and discussed further 
in sections 6.1 and 6.3, if it had restricted itself t o  simple alternatives of oil, 
coal, water power, nuclear generation, and so on, would not have been able to 
consider the  contribution of the allothermal coal liquefaction and gasification 
process that uses heat from breeder reactors or from hydrogen and that  there- 
fore adds greatly to the potential life of the world's coal reserves. 
On the borders of the process of formulating alternatives there are some 
issues of practice and professionalism that  deserve mention, although little 
prescriptive guidance can be offered. 
An alternative may be deemed to be impractical because it breaches esta- 
blished laws,  custom.^, prejudices, or attitudes. Thls does not necessarily mean 
that the akernative should not be considered; rather,  it means that ,  if it is con- 
sidered, the analyst will have a much larger burden of persuasion a t  the end of 
h s  study if it turns out to be attractive on other grounds. At this point he may 
face the issue of whether or not to  in t rodwe these social issues into h s  work, or 
to leave them for the client to judge. There are  fundamental difficulties here, as 
Churchman (1979) points out. However, my counsel is one of courage on the one 
hand (the client may surprise you with a burst of venturesome advocacy for 
change) but prudence on the other by having other arrows in the  quiver, even 
though they may not be as attractive. Impractical alternatives have been known 
to become practical after being pushed by someone with influence. 
Similarly, since a truly important issue worth a major systems analysis is 
bound to harbor political issues that will flower into debates when the findings 
emerge, political feasibility may be an issue to consider in formulating alterna- 
tives. Here again experience offers little advice, although some encouragement 
to be venturesome, the analyst being left for the most part to his own best judg- 
ment, whlch he should develop in concert with his client. 
It is here that the analyst may face two of the most important dilemmas of 
hls profession: 
How can he balance hls loyalty to science and the profession of systems 
analysis with the loyalty to his organization when they come into conflict? 
In the face of potentially negative responses to alternatives-some 
responses being possibly so strong as to threaten the analyst's survival in his 
post-how can he best exhibit the venturesome courage to design and explore 
controversial alternatives, and present them as preferred if they occupy this 
place in the findings? 
The inexperienced analyst's first reaction to these dilemmas may be to 
seek simply to avoid them-perhaps by dealing only with problems in which they 
cannot occur. But this is to doom h m  to the relative unimportance of problems 
of little moment: it is almost axiomatic that the coin of importance has a 
reverse that is controversy. Thus, the price the analyst must pay if he is to deal 
with problems of large and central importance is that he will be involved in the 
dilemmas of 1oyal.t~ and controversy. 
How is the analyst to  behave in the face of these dilemmas? This matter will 
be discussed later in section 10.14. 
7. CHOOSING MODES OF ANALYSIS 
Applied systems analysis is driven by its problems, not its methods. There- 
fore, the analyst should allow the problem to rule h s  choice of method, and this 
choice should be taken from an eclectic menu. He should choose methods and 
techniques that are appropriate, avoiding the seduction of popular or convenient 
technologies that may seem to add "class" to the analysis, but that are  essen- 
tially inappropriate. In the same vein, complications appropriate to the problem 
are necessary, and must be incorporated into the analysis, but those introduced 
merely to add analytic glitter to the product are to be shunned. 
Five positive principles may be enunciated: Choose analytic machinery that  
is : 
1. Appropriate to the problem and the prospective solutions to  it that  
may emerge. 
2. Internally consistent (the delicate analytic machinery of one part 
should not be bludgeoned by a hazy speculation in another). 
3. Balanced in detail and accuracy (if one enters with order-of-magnitude 
estimates, he is seldom entitled to five-figure accuracy in h s  results, or, if accu- 
rate estimates are  combined with very questionable estimates, this fact should 
be reflected in how the results are presented). 
4. Appropriately interdisciplinary in the light of the appreciation of the 
problem with which the work began and is being continued. 
5. Appropriate, if at  all possible, to the process of presenting the findings 
that will emerge at the end of the study (the client will surely not want to poke 
into the details, but a realistic understanding of the main building blocks and 
key relations has persuasive value for many users of systems analysis results). 
Ths  last point deserves further discussion. The complications that must be 
represented by models in a systems analysis arise from the problem being 
treated, and therefore one may argue that the model complications are  intrin- 
sic. However, in practice i t  not infrequently happens that the choice of a model 
is not so constrained as t h s  remark would imply; for example, it may be possi- 
ble to choose a series of relatively simple connected models rather than one 
very complicated comprehensive model, and yet get adequate results. When 
such a choice exists, there is some merit in making it a t  least partially in the 
light of how the results of the work will have to be presented to  the client. If the 
model used also provides a simple line of argument that  will be persuasive to a 
nontechnical person, thls value should be weighed in making the choice. 
Howard Raiffa, the founding Director of the International Institute for 
Applied Systems Analysis in Laxenburg, Austria, describes his experience this 
way (Raiffa 1978): 
As a n  analyst I have participated in several policy studies; as a 
professor in a public policy program I have critiqued a host of such stu- 
dies; and as a decisionmaker myself or as a consultant to  decisionmak- 
ers I have seen how such policy studies are used or not used. 
And, on the basis of this experience he offers this advice: 
In modeling reality for policy guidance there are  a host of options 
to consider. First of all, some advice: Beware of general purpose, 
grandiose models that  try to  incorporate practically everything. Such 
models are  difficult to validate, to interpret, to calibrate statistically, 
to manipulate, and most importantly to  explain. You may be better off 
not with one big model but with a se t  of simpler models, starting off 
with simple deterministic ones and complicating the model in stages as 
sensitivity analysis shows the need for such complications. A model 
does not have t o  address all aspects of the problem. I t  should be 
designed to aid in understanding the dynamic interactions of some 
phase of your problem. Other models can address other phases. 
Time constraints, however, may not allow you the luxury of tailor- 
ing models to fit your problem. You may have to  choose a model off 
the shelf, so to speak, and fiddle with fitting it as well as possible to  
your problem. But in these cases my advice is even more cogent: 
Keep it simple. 
8. CARRYING OUT THE ANALYSIS 
Thls issue has been discussed so thoroughly in earlier chapters that little 
needs saying here. However, three points deserve emphasis: 
The issue of documentation should be kept in mind from the beginning. 
The work should be documented as i t  proceeds, so that ,  a t  the end of the work, 
when attention is properly focused on communicating the findings and following 
up on them, it will not be necessary to return to the earlier work to 
reconstruct-sometimes with considerable difficulty-what was done. Documen- 
tation is as much a par t  of the professionalism of systems analysis as i t  is of 
pure science, and the need to have full and clear records at  the end of the pro- 
ject should be recognized and responded to. The easiest way to acheve this 
essential standard is to keep i t  in mind throughout, and to do what is necessary 
a t  each step of the analysis to build the records that  will allow others to see 
clearly what was done, and, if they should ever desire, to duplicate or extend the 
work. 
The work of the analysis should be done openly, so that the participating 
management personnel can understand, interpret, and report informally to 
their colleagues what is going on. Ths  policy risks possible misinterpretation, 
but t h s  risk is more than overcome by the benefits to be accrued. Ths  open- 
ness should also extend to others who may have legitimate interests in what is 
being done. 
Any systems analysis contains the results of major decisions about how to 
proceed. and how to interpret evidence-but there are also smaller ones that  the 
analyst must make from day to day as h s  work proceeds (can we ignore t b s  fac- 
tor? is ths small-sample estimate adequate? can this result from another study 
be relied on? is this small effect apparently exhibited by the data a realistic 
representation? and so on). Controlling these secondary analysis decisions so 
that they do not cumulatively vitiate the main thrust of the analysis is impor- 
tant, particularly in a large study with many parts and many analysts. There 
are no simple rules for doing this that I know of, beyond the one that says the 
leaders of the project should keep careful watch over this issue day by day as 
the analysis develops. If they do t h s ,  they will assure that the decisions are 
consistent, and that the potential impact on the findings can be assessed and 
reported candidly; if they do not, important flaws may seep into the work. Pur- 
suant to the first point, it is also important to  document these secondary deci- 
sions as carefully as the primary ones, together with estimates of their potential 
effects. 
Finally, after the analysis is complete, and the findings tentatively formu- 
lated, it is wise for the analysts to stand back and review their work. The back- 
ground context may have shifted, key client personnel may have changed, the 
analysts themselves will have developed new perspectives arising from their 
involvement with the problem, and so on-and such factors may have shifted the 
perspective on what was done and should have been done. This review may 
prompt some change of focus-perhaps even the development of some new alter- 
natives for last-minute investigation. 
I n  addition, the review should assess key variables and their impacts, be 
sure that the needed sensitivity analyses have been carried out, and carry out 
the supplementary analyses that the analysts and their clients may need to 
round out a good understanding of why the results came out as they did, and 
what their implications are. 
The analyst may argue that, with the work already behind schedule and with 
demanding reporting needs staring a t  him, there is no time for this final review. 
However, if he skips it,  he may deny his reporting the balanced current perspec- 
tive that his client will find most persuasive. 
9. FORMULATING THE FINDINGS 
The scientist inexperienced in systems analysis may well wonder why this 
topic needs taking up a t  all-since the work was aimed a t  discovering results; 
when they emerge surely the analyst recognizes and understands them. 
However, the client may not, and it is his understanding that is the goal of the 
analysis. Therefore, the experienced analyst knows that formulating the find- 
ings properly and effectively is a key task in his work, and involves some matters 
that deserve hls careful attention: 
The first of these is the most important: The formulation must be based, 
not on the interests of the analysts, but those of the client officials. 
The formulation should be balanced in terms of their needs and perspec- 
tives. Thus, matters of particular interest to them should be emphasized; oth- 
ers of minor interest should be passed over lightly, or even omitted entirely if 
time or space is limited. 
Special attention must be given to important results that may run 
counter to  intuitive beliefs of the client officials; if their outlooks are to be 
changed, the evidence aimed at changing'them must be carefully thought 
through and effectively presented. 
Care must be exercised in choosing the form of argumentation-the flow 
of evidence and logic-that will be persuasive to the client (Majone 198O), for, if 
the client does not factor the findings into his thinking in an effective way, much 
of the value of the work may be lost. 
In sum, while the findings of the analysis may present numerous matters of 
interest to the analysts, the items of value and interest to the clients deserve 
special attention devoted to their formulation, an effort that will extend to how 
best to present them. The analysts dealing with the estuary-protection problem 
discussed in section 3.4 faced t h s  problem, and devised a special approach, as 
we saw there. 
Generally, the approach to systems analysis presented in this Handbook has 
advocated continuing reconsideration of the problem as the analysis proceeds; 
in fact, of the nine steps in systems analysis listed in section 1.4, the fourth was: 
"Reconsider the problem in the light of the knowledge accumulating during the 
analysis." Raiffa ( 1978) argues the case even more strongly, urging that it is 
. . . helpful occasionally for analytical groups, even in their early 
deliberations, . . . to dwell a bit on the big picture: From problem for- 
mulation to policy generation to analysis to conflict resolution to advo- 
cacy to implementation and to evaluation; to try to identify those cru- 
cial issues that are a t  the cutting edge of the policy arguments; to 
examine, all along the way and not only at  the end of the analysis, how 
the separate pieces of analysis can be fused together into a holistic, 
balanced, coherent, realistic, acceptable, implementable policy recom- 
mendation. 
In formulating the findings of the analysis the systems analyst has his last-and 
perhaps most important-opportunity to conduct a sweeping reconsideration of 
the problem and the analysis response to it in the full panoply of its surrounding 
circumstances. He must make good use of this opportunity. 
The analysis plan that; was prepared at  the beginning of the work included a 
section on communicating the findings, and therefore on the sorts of communi- 
cation instruments that would be needed. When the findings are being formu- 
lated it is time to review this section and evolve a more detailed plan for com- 
municating them, especially since the analysis team has now grown much more 
familiar with the client organization and its people. Ths combination of 
knowledge of the results of the study and the needs and interests of the client 
will yield a changed and refined communication plan. The next section will dis- 
cuss preparing items that may appear in such a plan. 
10. PREPARING THE COMMUNICATION INSTRmENTS 
A major systems analysis study calls, not only for a variety of communica- 
tion instruments aimed at the varied audiences who are-or should 
be-interested, but also great care in preparing them. Indeed, the analysts who 
conducted the forest-pest analysis described in section 1.2 say (Holling 1978. p. 
120): "Our experience is that at least as much effort must go into communica- 
tion as goes into analysisw-and they cite other experience to confirm this 
judgment. While the  amount of effort involved in preparing communication 
instruments varies from case to case, there can be no doubt that  it is a very 
important step in the analysis activity, and one that deserves careful and 
creative thought. 
Whle several forms of reporting involving a number of media may be called 
for, the written report usually lies at  the core of the communication process. 
Not only is this document the central reference for all concerned, but also its 
preparation is the  final testing ground for how the findings will be  presented. It 
is the wellspring from which all of the other communication instruments flow. 
Therefore, I will discuss this document first. 
The systems analysis report. It should contain three parts: 
1. A summary (complete enough to tell the busy executive in a few 
minutes what the  problem was, what ground the analysts covered in their work, 
what the findings were, and what suggested courses of action a re  being pro- 
posed). 
2 .  The main report (written entirely in the language of the client organi- 
zation and containing the complete story of the work from a nontechnical point 
of view, but not including the details of the technical aspects of the analysis). 
3. The appendixes or supporting technical reports (containing the com- 
plete technical presentation of the analysis). 
To provide perspective, such a report could have a main body of several 
hundred pages, a summary of 25 pages, and perhaps more than a thousand 
pages of supporting material, perhaps available in several documents. For a less 
comprehensive study, the summary might be ten  pages long, the main body 80 
pages, with 150 pages of appendixes containing the technical material. For 
example: The global analysis of energy supply and demand described in section 
3.5, whlch occupied an analysis team over a seven-year span, was supported by 
some 80 technical reports (whch in turn  rested on a vast literature); the techni- 
cal report is a book of over 800 pages. T h s  book and its supporti.ng reports con- 
stitute for this case the t h r d  item in the list above. The "main report" is a book 
for the general reader of some 200 pages; the summary was published 
separately in a paperback report of about 60 pages. See Energy Systems Pro- 
gram Group (1981). 
The audiences are important in deciding what to say and how to say it: the 
summary is for busy officials who only want a quick view, the main body is for 
the officials and members of their staffs who want a full story in nontechnical 
terms, the appendixes are for technical experts who may want to review details, 
or perhaps even extend the work a t  a later time. 
The academic scientist accustomed to the space exigencies of today's 
technical journals may be startled by the redundancy of this approach: the 
same story is told three times in differing versions, depending on the audience. 
However, experience shows that academic conciseness will fail to communicate 
with the key audiences, whle this redundant form, if well executed, will be effec- 
tive. 
The other novelty of t h s  outline is the order in which it should be filled in. 
The experienced analyst does not start  a t  the beginning with the summary; 
rather, he starts with the appendix material, shaping it so that it will support 
the main body when it is written. This supporting material should be complete: 
data, assumptions, models, results of calculations, rationales for interpreta- 
tions, and so on and so on. After completing this foundation, a t  least in draft 
form, the analyst proceeds to write the main body of the report, keeping careful 
watch that its text rests solidly on the supporting material and that it speaks to 
the client and the members of his staff. At the same time, he has an eye on the 
exigencies of the summary that will bring the writing to a close. In fact, if the 
main body is shaped properly, the summary will almost write itself-after the 
heavy labor that preceded, an unalloyed joy! Finally, he writes the summary and 
the report is complete. For example, the reports describing the findings of the 
global energy analysis mentioned above were written in the sequence just 
described. 
There is another piece of advice that comes from experience: throughout 
the process of preparing the written report, it is wise to keep in mind the other 
communication instruments to be used, such as briefings with charts, slide 
shows, computer demonstrations, and so on (Holling 1978, Chapter 9, suggests 
some of the variety that has been useful in ecological work). Thus, material 
such as illustrations, charts, and tables can be worked up early that will be use- 
ful later in the various media of communication that are adopted. Then the writ- 
ten outlines, structural elements, and carefully worded findings will be all that 
will need to be added close to the times they will be used. 
Let us now turn to a more detailed discussion of the content of the main 
report. It should contain: 
Key aspects of the context surrounding the problem (while the audience 
for the report can be assumed to have a general knowledge of this context, it is 
usually the case that the appreciation of key aspects of it needs sharpening if 
the analysis and its findings are to be understood properly). 
A statement of the problem as it was finally evolved during the analysis. 
The principal facts and assumptions on whch the analysis is based. 
The alternatives considered (it is very important to take particular care 
with this section if, as is likely, any of the alternatives considered are novel or 
likely to be surprising to the client, or if it is necessary to explain why some 
"obvious" alternatives h.ave not been dealt with). 
The key elements in the chain of logic leading to the analysis results (this 
item is discussed further below). 
The findings. 
The implications of the findings ( t h s  section foreshadows the next one on 
courses of action). 
Possible courses of action, their advantages, disadvantages, and conse- 
quences. 
New demands posed by these courses of action: resources, reorganiza- 
tion, new outlooks, etc. 
Recommendations, if the analysis warrants them. 
A careful delineation of the ground covered by the analysis, and, even 
more important, the limits of the analysis and the ground not covered (this last 
point is an essential item of good professional practice, since i t  marks out the 
area in whch the systems analysis can help the client, as well a s  the area in 
which the client must continue to rely on h s  own judgment and such other infor- 
mation as he has; thus, the analyst avoids the pitfall of appearing to have done 
more than he actually did) 
The scientist entering systems analysis from another field may be surprised 
that this outline contains only one passing reference to the center of much of 
his professional interest, the  analytic machinery that produced the results, and 
this reference is in novel language ("the key elements in the chain of logic lead- 
ing to  the analysis results"). There is a good reason for t h s :  Unless the client is 
very unusual, he is not interested in such details, nor will an at tempt to educate 
hlm about them be anything but counterproductive. However, there may be a 
sirr~plified chain of logic based on the analysis details that sheds light on why the 
results came out as they did; in fact, this is usually the case, a t  least partially. 
To present this logical chain will be helpful; i t  should be included i f  it does not 
take too much space. 
The technical appendixes provide the support for the findings presented in 
the main body of the report ;  however, they need not repeat the peripheral 
material from the main body-although they should be full enough to stand 
pretty well alone. Here the analyst is talkmg to his professional colleagues, and 
may use any of the jargon, formulas, o r  other technical paraphernalia common 
in his field. 
The summary is written for the busy executive, and thus i t  should be rela- 
tively short. However, it must  contain a boiled down version of all of the irnpor- 
tant material in the main body of the report,  so that thls busy executive gets a 





























